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OIL OVER TROUBLED WATERS: EXXON SHIPPING CO. V.
BAKER AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
DETERMINATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN MARITIME LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Although nearly three decades have elapsed since the ground-
ing of the Exxon Valdez, one of history's most catastrophic oil
spills, the environmental, economic and legal ramifications con-
tinue to echo ominously throughout the world.1 The eleven mil-
lion gallon oil spill resulted in eleven thousand miles of oil-covered
shoreline, the death of approximately five hundred thousand sea-
birds, one thousand otters, three hundred harbor seals, and signifi-
cant impairment to the reproductive and genetic systems of
countless numbers of both aquatic and animal life.2 Despite Ex-
xon's initial expenditure of $3.4 billion in clean-up costs, local fish-
ing businesses, recreational sporting activities, tourism and other
native Alaskan subsistence practices have endured persistent harm.3
In the wake of the spill, heavy fines were imposed, private claims
were settled, legislative enactments were promulgated and lawsuits
were filed.4 The most controversial of which was a class action law-
suit brought by a group of plaintiffs whose livelihoods were de-
stroyed by the spill. 5
On June 25th, 2008, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (Exxon Ship-
ping Co.) 6 the United States Supreme Court finally put an end to a
fourteen year period of appellate limbo. 7 Apart from considering
Exxon's vicarious liability for an intoxicated sea captain and the
question of statutory preemption, the Supreme Court, for the first
1. See Oil, Out of Control, http://whyfiles.org/168oil_spill/index.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2009) (describing consequences of Exxon Valdez grounding); see
also The Encyclopedia of Earth, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, http://www.eoearth.org/
article/Exxon_Valdezoil spill (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (providing overview of
Exxon Valdez catastrophe).
2. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Numbers, http://aroundanchorage.blogspot.
com/2008/06/exxon-valdez-oil-spill-numbers.html (June 22, 2008, 20:38 PDT)
(depicting environmental, economic and legal consequences of Exxon Valdez oil
spill).
3. See id. (discussing economic repercussions of spill).
4. See id. (highlighting legal repercussions of spill).
5. See id. (noting extensive media coverage).
6. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
7. See id. at 2609 (concluding issues raised on appeal).
(247)
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time, viewed the standard of punitive damages through the lens of
federal maritime law rather than through constitutional due
process.8
Punitive damages have a deeply anchored history in maritime
law and are especially appropriate in maritime disaster cases, as
these calamities often exact incalculable, wide-spread harm.9 Addi-
tionally, existing federal maritime statutes, taken as a whole, indi-
cate that there is no present public policy supporting the limitation
of punitive damages in the corporate maritime context. 10 Despite
the lack of both historical and public policy support for the limita-
tion punitive damages, the Supreme Court decided to embark on a
new law-making venture by conceptualizing and formulating a fixed
ratio for determining punitive damage awards in maritime claims.'1
The Court's revolutionary one-to-one ratio bound the punitive
award determination to compensatory damages. 12 Consequently,
the initial $5 billion punitive damage award against Exxon was
trimmed down considerably to $500 million, which was determined
to be the price of justice. -1 3 For Exxon Mobile, the world's largest
energy company, earning $40.6 billion in profit in 2007 alone, the
punitive damages represented less than a week's profit. 14 Instead of
punishing Exxon and focusing on deterring similar conduct in the
future, the Court reduced the punitive award to just another cost of
doing business. 15 For the plaintiffs, the award reeked of injustice
8. See id. at 2626 (distinguishing current analysis arising under federal mari-
time jurisdiction from past due process review under Constitution). Typically, the
Supreme Court reviews punitive damage awards under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that they are neither arbitrary nor grossly
excessive. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-17
(2003) (setting forth guidelines to determine appropriateness of punitive damage
awards).
9. For a further discussion of the role of punitive damages in maritime law,
see infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the legal topography of punitive damages in
maritime law, see infra notes 74-109 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the reasoning behind Exxon Shipping Co., see
infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the reduction in punitive damages, see infra
notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the holding of Exxon Shipping Co., see infra
notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
14. SeeJonathan Heller, Exxon Mobil: The Root of All Evil?, SEEKING ALPHA, Apr.
13, 2008, http://seekingalpha.com/article/72027 (expressing extreme alarm at
Exxon Mobile's conduct).
15. See Andrew C. Revkin, What Does Exxon Owe Alaskans? 1994: $5 Billion;
2006: $2.5 Billion; Today: $0.5 Billion, DOT EARTH, June 25, 2008, http://dotearth.
blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/ (discussing minimal effect of reduced award on
Exxon).
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and exemplified yet another example of the judicial system catering
to big business. 16 The extent to which the Court's conclusions will
impact future litigation and judicial decision making has yet to be
seen. It is anticipated, however, that there will be far-reaching
consequences. 17
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Ship-
ping Co. Part II of this Note relays the disturbing factual scenario
that gave rise to the United States' most infamous oil spill and the
resulting protracted litigation.' 8 Part III presents a brief overview
of maritime and admiralty law and then discusses the application of
punitive damages within those frameworks.' 9 Part IV details the
Court's analysis in reaching its decision to drastically reduce Ex-
xon's liability by creating and implementing a one-to-one ratio.20
Part V respectfully critiques the outcome of this case by highlight-
ing the Court's participation in an attempted tug-of-war with legisla-
tive power while simultaneously drawing attention to the unique
nature of maritime law.2 1 Finally, Part VI attempts to provide some
foresight, by discussing the potential impact of this monumental
decision both onshore, in general common law, and offshore, in
other areas of maritime law.22
II. FACTS
On March 23, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker, carrying fifty-
three million gallons of oil, departed from the Valdez port in
Alaska. 23 The ship was owned by Exxon Shipping, a subsidiary of
the oil company, Exxon. 24 The ship's master, Captain Joseph Ha-
zelwood, was an Exxon employee whose drinking habits had alleg-
edly been monitored by Exxon for a period of four years before the
16. See Heller, supra note 14 (describing plaintiffs' emotional reactions).
17. For a further discussion of the implications of Exxon Shipping Co., see infra
notes 205-27 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the facts of Exxon Shipping Co., see infra notes
23-51 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the legal background information, see infra
notes 52-109 and accompanying text.
20. For a narrative analysis of the Court's decision in Exxon Shipping Co., see
infra notes 110-43 and accompanying text.
21. For a critical analysis of the Court's decision in Exxon Shipping Co., see
infra notes 144-204 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion concerning the potential impact of Exxon Shipping
Co., see infra notes 205-27 and accompanying text.
23. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611-14 (2008) (describing
factual details of oil spill).
24. See id. at 2611 (highlighting Exxon ownership).
20091
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incident.25 At the time of the spill, Hazelwood was intoxicated and
inexplicably absent from the wheel when the ship struck the Bligh
Reef.2 6 The Valdez ran aground, dumping eleven million gallons
of oil into the then environmentally pristine Prince William Sound
(the Sound). 27 The timing, conditions of the spill, and location of
the grounding, coupled with the abundance of wildlife in the area,
resulted in devastating environmental damage and the destruction
of local businesses. 28
Despite an extensive clean-up attempt that involved $2.1 bil-
lion in expenditure costs, Exxon paid millions of dollars in private
claims and over a billion dollars in the settlement of suits brought
by both the Alaskan and United States governments. 29 An addi-
tional class action suit was brought by 32,677 private parties who
depended upon the Sound for their livelihood. 30 An Alaskan jury
awarded the plaintiffs twenty million dollars in compensatory dam-
ages.3  Upon finding both Exxon and Hazelwood to be careless,
the jury awarded an additional five billion dollars in punitive dam-
ages against Exxon and five thousand dollars in punitive damages
against Hazelwood. 32
25. See id. at 2612 (reviewing witness testimony regarding Captain Hazel-
wood's observed drinking prior to departure of Valdez). A testifying witness said
that before the Valdez departed, Captain Hazelwood "downed at least five double
vodkas in the waterfront bars of Valdez. Id. Based on a blood alcohol test adminis-
tered eleven hours after the spill, experts testified that Hazelwood's blood alcohol
level was approximately 0.241 at the time of the spill, approximately three times
the legal limit for driving in most states. Id. at 2613.
26. See id. (acknowledging Hazelwood left ship's supervision to unlicensed
subordinates, third mate Gregory Cousins and helmsman Robert Kagan).
27. See id. (narrating acts leading up to ship's grounding).
28. See Katie Markey, Life After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Impacts, Conflicts,
and Management - Plans in Prince William Sound (2000) (unpublished student
work), available at http://www.srnr.arizona.edu/-gimblett/ExxonValdezImpacts
_ConflictsManagement.pdf (investigating spill's massive environmental and eco-
nomic repercussions).
29. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2608 (describing aftermath of spill).
30. See id. at 2613 (classifying diverse plaintiffs consisting of Alaskan landown-
ers, commercial fisherman and Native American groups, as Baker). Exxon's volun-
tary claims program had not properly accounted for the degree of economic harm
suffered by these plaintiffs. Id.
31. See id. at 2614 (noting jury awarded compensatory damages in Alaskan
District Court). Compensatory damages reimburse plaintiffs for calculable injury
suffered. Id. Although this amount was originally $287 million, it was later re-
duced to reflect settlements and claims made by Exxon during the trial. Id.
32. See id. at 2612 (relaying jury awarded punitive damages in Alaskan District
Court). Plaintiffs accused Hazelwood of failing to provide navigation watch be-
cause he was under the influence of alcohol. Id. Plaintiffs chastised Exxon for
neglecting to supervise Hazelwood, despite having been told about Hazelwood's
drinking condition previously. Id.
4
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Exxon subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, contesting both the appropriateness and amount of the puni-
tive damage award. 33 Although the Ninth Circuit upheld the
award, it recommended a reduction in light of recent Supreme
Court due process decisions. 34 The district court subsequently re-
duced the award to $4 billion, after which the Ninth Circuit sua
sponte remanded the case for consideration. 35 The district judge
then increased the award to $4.5 billion with interest and Exxon
appealed for a third time.36 The Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in
2006, ultimately reducing the award to $2.5 billion. 37 This was fol-
lowed by Exxon's petition to the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, which was granted on October 29, 2007.38
In the ensuing litigation, only four Supreme Court Justices
joined the opinion in its entirety.3 9 Despite Exxon's creative argu-
ments, which contested the constitutionality of the award, the Su-
preme Court limited its review to the legality of the award under
U.S. maritime law.40 First, Exxon argued that the review was unnec-
essary because of Congress's statutory preemption in the Clean
Water Act (CWA) .41 Second, Exxon used amicus briefs from sev-
eral different constituencies in an attempt to support its position
that vicarious liability is inapplicable in maritime situations.42
Third, Exxon emphasized that its $3.4 billion expenditure on clean-
up efforts, fines, penalties and settlements was a sufficient
punishment. 43
The plaintiffs countered that, due to the enormity of the result-
ing harm, it was irrelevant that the award surpassed previous
awards, and appealed to the Court's moral and ethical sympa-
33. See id. (describing procedural posture of case).
34. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2614 (noting Ninth Circuit's adjust-
ment of award amount).
35. See id. (identifying Ninth Circuit's slight reduction in punitive damages
after factoring common law developments).
36. See id. (highlighting district court's increasing punitive award).
37. See id. (noting Ninth Circuit's opinion before Exxon petitioned for writ of
certiorari).
38. See id. (acknowledging granting Exxon's petition for writ of certiorari).
39. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. 2605. Four members concurred in part
and dissented in part. Justice Samuel Alito recused himself because he owned Ex-
xon Mobil stock.
40. See id. at 2610, 2626 (limiting review to federal maritime law and rejecting
Exxon's reliance on 1818 case).
41. See id. at 2618 (describing Exxon's CWA preemption argument).
42. See id. at 2615-17 (reviewing Exxon's attempt at taking responsibility for
liability).
43. See id. (describing Exxon's reference to previous expenditures).
20091
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thies. 44 Plaintiffs also highlighted that a $2.5 billion award was not
excessive, due to the fact that it was merely equal to a couple weeks
of Exxon's 2007 net profits. 45 Plaintiffs further argued that the ap-
proach to addressing punitive damages in maritime cases should
follow the standard that forty-eight states currently use and which
the CWA allows. 46 The Plaintiffs also asserted that even if such an
award was preempted, Exxon waived their rights under the CWA by
not raising the issue until thirteen months after the verdict.
4 7
In determining whether maritime law permitted corporate lia-
bility for punitive damages based on the acts of a managerial agent,
the Court reached a four-to-four decision, thereby leaving the
Ninth Circuit's ruling "undisturbed."48 The Court held that the
CWA's penalties for water pollution do not preempt punitive dam-
age awards in maritime oil spill cases.49 Additionally, the Court,
acting in its capacity as an admiralty court, ruled that the punitive
damage award levied against Exxon was excessive as a matter of
maritime common law and thus limited the award to an amount
equivalent to compensatory damages. 50 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion to create and enforce a one-to-one ratio slashed the damage
award to $500 million, and in effect concluded a long volatile and
vitriolic legal saga.51
III. BACKGROUND
A. Knowing the Ropes: A Brief Overview of Maritime Law
The United States Constitution provides "that the judicial
power of the government shall extend... to all causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. '5 2 Yet, while maritime law can be con-
44. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2615 (acknowledging Exxon's refer-
ence to previous expenditures).
45. See id. (highlighting merits of respondents' arguments). See a/soJan Craw-
ford Greenburg, Oil and Water, ABC NEWS, Feb. 28 2008, http://blogs.abcnews.
com/legalities/2008/02/oil-and-water.html (describing how one of original plain-
tiffs bought jar with residual oil to Washington).
46. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2615-16 (discussing respondents'
counter-arguments).
47. See id. at 2616 (acknowledging Exxon's untimely CWA objection).
48. See id. at 2609 (deciding to leave Ninth Circuit's reasoning on Exxon's
vicarious liability intact).
49. For a further discussion of the Court's reasoning on the issue of CWA
preemption, see infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
50. For a further discussion of the Court's reasoning on the issue of punitive
damages, see infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.
51. For a further discussion of the Court's newly created mathematical
formula, see infra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (delegating maritime authority to judiciary).
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sidered 'judge-made law to a great extent," it is also largely statutory
law.53 Maritime tort law, in particular, is dominated by federal stat-
utes such as the Jones Act, Clean Water Act, Oil Pollution Act,
Death on the High Seas Act and Trans-Atlantic Pipeline Association
Act.54 If a congressional statute covers a cause of action, the statute,
and not judicially-created law, will prevail.55 Moreover, in enacting
statutes, the legislature does not merely enact general policies, but
also "indicates its conception of the sphere within which the policy
is to have effect."56 In this era, therefore, it is firmly established
that, for policy guidance, an admiralty court should rely primarily
on existing legislative enactments. 57
Nevertheless, when Congress has not addressed a question di-
rectly, courts are not free to supplement the answer to such an ex-
tent that existing statutes or acts become meaningless. 58 Only in
the rare situation where a statutory scheme prescribes a "compre-
hensive tort recovery regime to be uniformly applied," may a plain-
tiff be deprived of tort remedies beyond what that scheme
provides. 59 In the absence of any relevant statute, courts may be
able, albeit rarely, to justify the conceptualization and formulation
of new rules upon a showing of special circumstances. 60 Absent
such a showing, when federal courts develop common law in admi-
ralty, it should be developed in tandem with the existing legislative
enactments of Congress. 61
53. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259
(1979) (holding admiralty law is judge-made law to great extent). But see Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) (emphasizing Congressional superiority).
54. See generally Miles, 498 U.S. at 36 (describing proliferation of federal stat-
utes in maritime law).
55. See Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1496 (5th Cir.
1995) (determining when Jones Act was enacted Congress incorporated Federal
Employment Liability Act (FELA) unaltered into Jones Act and must have in-
tended to incorporate FELA pecuniary limitation on damages as well).
56. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (recognizing
policies behind legislative enactments).
57. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 27 (highlighting importance of incorporating legisla-
tive enactments into judicial decision making).
58. See id. at 31 (holding "courts are not free to supplement Congress' answer
so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless.") (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Hig-
ginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
59. SeeYamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 215 (1996) (describing
when and why enlargement of statutory provisions is inappropriate).
60. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2635 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing rare occasion when Courts may perform Congress' func-
tion and enforce entirely judicial concept).
61. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (emphasizing
despite continued and established tradition of federal common lawmaking in ad-
miralty, law is to be developed according to existing legislative enactments).
2009]
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B. The Devil to Pay: Punitive Damages in Maritime Law
There is a long history of punitive damage awards in maritime
and admiralty claims. 62 In 1818, the United States Supreme Court
in The Amiable Nancy 3 acknowledged that punitive damages could
be a proper penalty for the plundering of a vessel and the assault of
its crew without provocation. 64 Although punitive damages were
denied against the owner of the vessel because of his lack of privity
and knowledge, the concept of punitive damages was officially
anchored in maritime law.65 Considering the unique potential of
maritime disasters to cause incalculable, widespread harm and the
"concomitant role of punitive damages in helping prevent the repe-
tition of such disasters," subsequent admiralty decisions emphasized
the necessity of punitive damages in maritime law.
66
Thereafter, in The Yankee v. Gallagher (The Yankee),67 the first
admiralty case to assess punitive damages, the captain of a vessel,
who breached his duty by deporting the plaintiff, for a "wanton con-
tempt and violation of the law, was penalized." 68 It was not until
1981, however, that courts started to award punitive damages for
willful, wanton, grossly negligent, or unconscionable conduct; "a
callous disregard for the rights of others. '69 Currently, in maritime
litigation, punitive damage issues arise most frequently in cases in-
volving ship employers who willfully fail to pay maintenance or
cover expenses for sick or injured crew members.70 The Supreme
62. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 73, 77 (1997) (outlining history of punitive damages in admiralty).
63. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
64. See id. at 558-59 (acknowledging appropriateness of punitive damage
awards).
65. See THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw 170 (Thomp-
son West 2004) (1987) (outlining emergence of punitive awards in maritime and
Amiable Nancy's historical relevance).
66. See Ralston v. The State Rights, 20 F. Cas. 201, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1836) (No.
11,540) (holding it is determination and duty of not only courts, but of every good
citizen to keep Delaware River exempt from maritime disasters). See alsoJohn W.
DeGravelles, Uncertain Seas for Maritime Punitive Damages, TRIAL, Jan. 2004, at 50, 50
(discussing punitive damages' concomitant role in maritime law).
67. 30 Fed. Cas. 781, 781 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 18,124).
68. See id. (awarding punitive damages against vessel master who illegally
transported plaintiff to Sandwich Islands).
69. See Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767
F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding punitive damages may be imposed for
conduct which manifests reckless or callous disregard for rights of others or which
shows gross negligence or actual malice or criminal indifference).
70. See Paul S. Edelman & James E. Mercante, Exxon Valdez: Oil Spill, Punitives
and Secret Deals, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 2008, available at http://www.kreindler.com/
publications/htmllpubs/NYLJ-admiralty-law-9-19-08.html (highlighting frequency
of punitive damage awards in maritime). See also Warren v. United States, 340 U.S.
8
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Court has also held that punitive damages, under state law, may be
awarded in admiralty as a supplemental remedy.7' Additionally, pu-
nitive damages may be awarded in cases of intentional tort in admi-
ralty and bad faith denial of insurance benefits.7 2 Courts have been
particularly generous with punitive damages in certain areas such as
purely emotional injuries which are compensable under maritime
law when plaintiffs "satisfy the physical injury or impact rule. '73
Generally, punitive damages have been accepted and awarded in a
wide range of situations in maritime law.
In federal common law, non-maritime Supreme Court deci-
sions have imposed limitations on punitive damage awards in order
to meet the constitutional requirements of due process.74 Simulta-
neously, under admiralty law, certain statutes imposed qualifica-
tions in situations where unrestrained punitive damages would be
inappropriate.7 5  For instance, in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.
(Miles),7 6 the Supreme Court held that societal damages were not
recoverable for the wrongful death of a seaman because of the limi-
tations imposed by the Jones Act,77 which specifically precludes pu-
nitive damages and applies to claims made by seamen under
general maritime law.78 The Court's holding was based on the prin-
ciple that Congress retains superior authority in maritime matters,
523, 526 (1951) (describing action for maintenance and cure may also be brought
under general maritime law).
71. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 215-16 (1996) (holding in
case of non-seafarer killed in state territorial waters, state law damages may be
awarded).
72. See Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Serv., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 171, 176 (E.D. La.
1984) (stating employer did not act "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for op-
pressive reasons"); see also Daughdrill v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 665 F.
Snpp. 477, 486 (E.D. La. 1987) (holding that allowing insurance coverage for puni-
tive damages frustrates purpose of awarding punitive damages under maritime
law).
73. See Gough v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 996 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir.
1993) (awarding punitive damages due to satisfaction of impact rule).
74. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991) (outlining factors
to be considered). These factors are as follows: (1) degree of reprehensibility of
misconduct; (2) disparity between compensatory damages and punitive award; and
(3) comparability of punitive award and court penalties in similar cases. Id.
75. See Robertson, supra note 62, at 80-85 (discussing statutes defining punitive
damages in maritime law).
76. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
77. See id. at 29 (yielding to limitation imposed by Jones Act). Congress en-
acted the Jones Act to provide protection to persons who are members of the crew
of a ship or vessel. Id. at 23.
78. See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2006) (governing liability of vessel operators and
marine employers for work-related injury or death of an employee).
2009]
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and that admiralty courts must "be vigilant not to overstep the well-
considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation." 79
Yet, the extent to which the holding in Miles precludes punitive
damage awards in admiralty law generally remains unsetded;80 the
Third Circuit has even refused to decide the question. 81 Although
few courts have followed "the curse of Miles," other courts have
taken a more restrictive view, supporting the availability of punitive
damages to non-seafarer plaintiffs or in cases where statutory law
and general maritime law do not overlap. 82 In the Complaint of
Merry Shipping, Inc. (Meny),83 the Fifth Circuit Court held that puni-
tive damages should be available when a ship-owner has willfully
violated the duty to furnish and maintain a seaworthy vessel.8 4 Fol-
lowing Merry, some courts have taken the position that the Jones Act
may not permit recovery for non-pecuniary losses, but that punitive
damages may be awarded in different circumstances. 85
Additionally, another statute, the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), explicitly precludes recovery of punitive damages in
79. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 36 (emphasizing congressional limitations imposed
on admiralty courts).
80. See DeGravelles, supra note 66, at 51-57 (describing vastly different interpre-
tations of Miles holding).
81. See Phillip v. U.S. Lines Co., 355 F.2d 25, 25 (3d Cir. 1966) (expressly choos-
ing not to decide whether in other cases punitive damages are recoverable under
Jones Act).
82. See Wahlstrom v. Kawaski Heavy Indus., 4 F.3d 1084, 1094 (2d Cir. 1993)
(restricting availability of punitive damages); see also Bridgett v. Odeco, Inc., 646
So. 2d 1249, 1252-54 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting award of punitive damages);
but see Abogado v. Int'l Marine Carriers, 890 F. Supp. 626, 632-33 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(emphasizing availability of punitive damages when not explicitly obstructed by
statutes). See Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of
Seeking "Uniformity" and "Legislative Intent" in Maritime Personal Injury Cases, 55 LA. L.
REv. 745, 791 n.174 (1995) (highlighting forty-three states recognize punitive dam-
ages); John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law ?, 24 Hous.
J. ITr'L L. 249, 249 (2003) (emphasizing appropriateness of punitive awards in
admiralty).
83. 650 F.2d 622 (1981).
84. See id. at 623 (recognizing availability of punitive damages in general mari-
time law).
85. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1146 (6th Cir. 1969) (re-
versing punitive damage award under Jones Act, but holding punitive damages
might be recoverable under different circumstances); see Duplantis v. Texaco, Inc.,
771 F. Supp. 787, 788-89 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding when injured seaman did not
claim injuries from unseaworthiness, he could recover punitive damages against oil
company for failing to mark submerged obstructions); Spangler v. N. Star Drilling
Co., 552 So. 2d 673, 683 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding punitive damages are not
recoverable under Jones Act but are available under general maritime law).
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wrongful death actions arising on the high seas. 86 The legislative
history of DOHSA, however, is bereft of any indication that Con-
gress meant to change the law of punitive damages in any other
respect.87 The statute, therefore, is not intended to preclude the
availability of general maritime law remedies in situations not cov-
ered by the Act.88 Furthermore, under the Limitation of the Ship-
owner's Liability Act (The Limitation Act), punitive damages are
limited in cases of imputed fault.89 This statute operates to shield
from liability ship-owners charged with wrongdoing committed
without their privity or knowledge.90 The Limitation Act's protec-
tions thus render large punitive damage awards functionally un-
available in a wide range of admiralty cases. 91 Throughout history,
there have been a vast array of federal statutes which govern liability
in maritime law.92 Where punitive damages have been limited or
excluded, it has been explicitly set forth in legislative enactments. 93
Although there are maritime statutes which both prohibit cer-
tain remedies and remain silent on the availability of punitive dam-
ages, restrictions on certain remedies do not carry any implication
of similar intent in the realm of punitive awards.94 This lack of in-
tention can be discerned from the area of maritime disasters caused
86. See Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (2006) (attempting
to make it easier for widows of seamen to recover damages for future earnings
when death occurs in international waters).
87. See Robertson, supra note 62, at 164 (recognizing punitive damages still
applicable in areas not explicitly addressed).
88. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396 n.12 (1970)
(highlighting Congress intended to insure continued availability of remedy, histor-
ically provided by state, for death in territorial waters).
89. See 46 U.S.C. § 183 (2006) (stating ship-owners are entitled to limit liabil-
ity if negligence or unseaworthy condition which caused loss occurred without
privity and knowledge of owner).
90. See id. (providing certain factual prerequisites must be met).
91. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2635 (U.S. 2008) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (referring to wide applicability of Limitation Act).
92. See Robertson, supra note 62, at 134-35 (describing statutory landscape of
maritime law).
93. See Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d
1379, 1387 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding punitive awards are appropriate for employer
for acts of managerial employees). But see Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989
F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding punitive damages were prohibited by
Jones Act and therefore barred).
94. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 n.16 (1970)
(holding congressional decision to place such areas as national parks, which are
carved from existing state territories and are subject to no other general body of
law, under state laws "carries no implication of similar intent in vastly different
realm of admiralty").
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primarily by the discharge of oil.95 Presently, no federal statutes
comprehensively deal with punitive damages for injuries to private
parties caused by the discharge of oil into navigable waters. 96 Nev-
ertheless, certain federal statutes are pertinent in connection with
actions to recover damages resulting from such injuries.97 These
statutes "establish[ ] not only the attitude with which courts should
approach a case in which damages are claimed for injuries resulting
from oil pollution. . . [but also] set[ ] forth Congress' goals and
policy with respect to restoring and preserving the nation's waters
through federal action."98
In recent years, this area of the law has attracted a torrent of
legislative and judicial attention, resulting in the imposition of civil
liability upon vessel operators for oil-related damages. 99 For exam-
ple, after the infamous Valdez spill, Congress enacted the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990 (OPA) to govern oil spills and establish private
remedies.' 00 The OPA is intentionally silent on the availability of
punitive damages, however it forces additional responsibility on oil
spillers for clean-ups by providing tougher penalties and greater lia-
bility.101 Oil and other pollutants are also regulated by other stat-
utes such as the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA). 10 2 These Acts may preempt
certain maritime tort remedies, but do not forestall or restrict puni-
tive awards. ' 03
Furthermore, the CWA is intentionally silent on punitive dam-
ages and chooses "not to alter the existing full range of private com-
95. SeeJean F. Rydstrom, ANNOTATION, Damages Compensable Under Federal Mar-
itime Law for Injuries Caused by Discharge of Oil into Navigable Waters, 26 A.L.R. FED.
346, 346 (1976) (highlighting lack of legislative specificity).
96. See id. at 350 (describing pertinent existing statutory provisions).
97. See id. at 351 (explaining relevance of statutes despite lack of addressing
issues specifically).
98. Id. at 351-55 (internal citation omitted) (discussing statutory signals and
guidance).
99. See id. at 351 (noting proliferation of legislative acts in recent years).
100. See The Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006) (establishing
new requirements to provide enhanced capabilities for oil spill response and natu-
ral resource damage assessment).
101. See id. § 2701 (highlighting OPA gave rise to fear of unlimited damages
in maritime industry and renders uninsurable punitive damages limitless).
102. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006) (governing water
pollution by establishing goals and setting forth standards); Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (2006) (governing water pollution by
establishing goals and setting forth standards).
103. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 115-16 (2000) (holding maritime
casualty reporting is preempted by comprehensive federal regulatory scheme gov-
erning oil tankers).
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mon law tort remedies for harm to private economic and quasi-
economic resources."10 4 Additionally, with the passage of TAPAA,
Congress altered the liability regime governing certain types of
Alaskan oil spills by imposing strict liability and capping financial
recovery. 10 5 TAPAA was passed only after securing the oil industry's
assurance that their tankers would employ extensive safety mea-
sures in order to protect the Sound's pristine and resource-rich wa-
ters.' 0 6 Notably, again, Congress did not restrict the availability of
punitive damages.1 0 7
Admiralty courts have a duty to adhere to legislative signals and
policy guidelines.10 8 By not specifically prohibiting or limiting pu-
nitive damages in these Acts, Congress most likely intended to en-
sure the continued and unrestrained availability of punitive awards
as an appropriate remedy for oil-related maritime disasters. 10 9
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Exxon Shipping Co., the United States Supreme Court began
its decision by asserting jurisdiction over all maritime matters.'10
After briefly addressing a ship-owner's derivative liability, the Court
was equally divided and chose to leave the lower court's decision on
Exxon's vicarious responsibility intact.1 1' The second issue the
Court addressed was the question of preemption. 112 Despite criti-
cizing the Ninth Circuit for exceeding its discretion, the Court did
not agree with Exxon's argument that the CWA preempted puni-
tive damages, but not compensatory damages, for economic loss.'13
The CWA's explicit interest in protecting water, shorelines and nat-
ural resources was interpreted broadly by the Court to encompass
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (expressing scope of applicability).
105. See 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (elaborating on effects of statutory provisions).
106. See id. (discussing goals and standards of TAPAA). At the time that
TAPAA was passed, several federal agencies had conducted studies on the social,
environmental, and economic impacts of a trans-Alaskan pipeline. Id.
107. See id. (lacking any punitive damage restriction).
108. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 24 (1990) (reiterating legisla-
tive signals and judiciary guidelines).
109. See Moragne v. State Marine Lines Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 397-98 (1970) (hold-
ing when Congress does not explicitly preclude availability of remedy, it should be
available).
110. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008) (asserting
jurisdiction over matter).
111. See id. at 2616 (declining to interfere with lower court's ruling concern-
ing Exxon's vicarious liability); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (noting
when holding has no precedential value).
112. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2616 (stating second issue to be
addressed).
113. See id. at 2618 (acknowledging Ninth Circuit's procedural oversight).
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requirements imposed on sub-silentio oil companies. 114 The Court
also appropriately determined that in passing the CWA, Congress
did not displace, or in any way diminish, the availability of common
law punitive damage remedies." 5 The CWA's remedial scheme
would, therefore, not be hindered by holding Exxon liable for vio-
lating its common law duty to refrain from harming the livelihoods
of private individuals. 116
The final and pivotal question before the Court was whether
the lower court's $2.5 billion punitive damages award fell within the
limits prescribed by federal maritime law."1 7 Since the case came
under the jurisdiction of federal maritime law, the Court did not
undertake a constitutional analysis or consider due process viola-
tions. 1 8 The Court acknowledged that its analysis was a significant
departure from previous decisions addressing punitive damages,
and focused on its deep concern for "the stark unpredictability of
punitive awards."' 19 Justice Souter repeatedly stated that the ruling
was in the context of maritime law; the Court's reasoning, however,
was less about maritime law and more about the perceived general
need for predictable and consistent punitive damage awards.
In seeking to justify a lower punitive award, the Court con-
ducted an overview of the history of punitive damages and their
dual purpose of both punishment and deterrence.120 Furthermore,
the Court considered the different treatment of punitive damages
among various states as well as the United States' punitive awards
relative to the international community. 12' The Court determined
that a lower award was appropriate because Exxon's conduct was
114. See id. at 2619 (addressing scope of CWA).
115. See id. (finding CWA preempts neither compensatory nor punitive dam-
ages for maritime cases).
116. See id. (determining Congressional intent and concluding punitive dam-
ages would not interfere with CWA provisions).
117. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2619 (stating final issue to be consid-
ered in case).
118. See id. at 2626 (discussing boundaries of review).
119. See id. at 2625 (referring to need for consistency and predictability).
120. See id. at 2620-22 (conducting overview of punitive damage history in
common law).
121. See id. at 2622-24 (acknowledging treatment and determination of puni-
tive damages in various states and different countries); see also John Y. Gotanda,
Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 394-95
(2004) (noting despite controversy over appropriateness, punitive damages are
widely available in countries such as England, Australia, New Zealand and Ca-
nada). See generally John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Dam-
ages: Is the Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 508 (2007) (analyzing
landscape of punitive damages in common law).
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"worse than negligent but less than malicious."1 22 Attempting to
produce systemic consistency in "the analogous business of criminal
sentencing," the Supreme Court concluded that only a quantified
approach to punitive damages would produce the desired uniform-
ity. 123 The Court, therefore, eschewed reliance on "verbal formula-
tions" typically required in jury instructions. 124 Instead, the Court
favored using a maximum multiple or ratio to correlate punitive
damages to compensatory damages instead of placing a "hard dol-
lar cap" on punitive damages. 125 In doing so, great emphasis was
given to empirical studies revealing that the median punitive dam-
age award in common law decisions was approximately sixty-five
percent of the compensatory awards.' 26
In weighing this data, the Court recognized a great disparity
between high and low punitive damage awards,127 and believed that
if allowed to stand, the $2.5 billion award would be an outlier.128 A
one-to-one ratio, which was above the median award, was therefore
considered a fair upper limit in maritime cases, regardless of the
resulting harm. 29 Yet, the Court chose not to decide whether the
same outer limit applied as a matter of due process mandated by
the Constitution. 30 In addition, the Court also left unanswered the
question of whether interest should be awarded.' 3' Instead, the
122. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2631-34 (relaying data used to reach one-
to-one ratio).
123. See id. at 2628-29 (finding parallels between punitive damage determina-
tion and criminal sentencing practices).
124. See id. at 2628 (considering available statistical and analytical methods).
125. See id. at 2629 (rejecting option of setting a hard-dollar punitive cap); see,
e.g.,Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 546-547 (1983) (declin-
ing to adopt fixed formula to account for inflation in discounting future wages to
present value in light of unpredictability of inflation rates and variation among
lost-earnings cases). It would be difficult to settle upon a particular dollar figure as
appropriate across the board due to the lack of certain standard injuries and a
judicially selected dollar cap would carry the serious drawback that the issue might
not return to the docket before there was a need to revisit the figure selected.
Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2929.
126. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2625-33 (referring to statistical
studies).
127. See id. at 2625 (asserting thrust of empirical figures indicated spread is
great and outlier cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf corre-
sponding compensatories).
128. See id. (discussing why reduced award was appropriate).
129. See id. (justifying creation of newly imposed ratio).
130. See id. (attempting to limit scope of review).
131. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2627 (deciding to leave awarding of
interest unanswered).
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Court "declined to rule in the first instance" and claimed that the
question should be answered by the Ninth Circuit. 132
In reaching its conclusions, the members of the Court differed
on a variety of points and there was a major divergence between the
majority and dissent. 133 Justice Stevens, in particular, raised com-
pelling objections. 134 In light of the many federal statutes that al-
ready govern admiralty law, Justice Stevens castigated the majority's
decision to limit punitive damages in the maritime context. 135 Jus-
tice Stevens' dissent highlighted the absence of statutes which ex-
pressly restrict punitive damages, indicating a lack of congressional
intent to protect wrongdoers such as Exxon.136 Justice Stevens also
pointed to maritime law's "less generous remedial scheme" and the
compensatory function of punitive damages as reasons for not
adopting a fixed ratio to limit such awards. 137 The imposition of
caps and ratios, Justice Stevens insisted, was meant to be handled by
the legislature, not the Court. 13 8
Yet, despite the dissent's objections that the adoption of a limit
would usurp Congress' legislative function, the majority concluded
that the absence of statutorily imposed limitations did not imply a
congressional intent favoring unconstrained punitive damages. 139
132. See id. at 2635 (concluding without addressing all matters).
133. See id. at 263940 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (questioning impacts of one-
to-one ratio). Justice Breyer's concurrence observes that while he has no jurispru-
dential problem with a court-mandated mathematical ratio, he believes that the
$2.5 billion award was justified here, and should be allowed as a limited exception
to the rule the Court just created. Id. at 2640-41 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices
Scalia and Justice Thomas wrote a two-sentence concurrence, observing that while
the Court's decision was correct as based on its prior holdings, they continue to
believe that those prior holdings were decided incorrectly. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
134. See id. at 2634 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating objections to major-
ity's reasoning).
135. See id. at 2635 (acknowledging large number of federal maritime statutes
insufficiently addressed by majority).
136. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2635 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
Congress has not expressed interest to protect business giants who cause cascading
harm).
137. See id. at 2636 (spotlighting maritime law's unique remedial scheme).
138. See id. (differentiating congressional power from judicial power).
139. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2630-32 (majority opinion) (refuting
dissents' objections by citing to responsibilities for common law remedies when
Congress has not made first move); see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
749 (2006) (plurality opinion) (noting Court's "oft-expressed skepticism towards
reading the tea leaves of congressional inaction") and United States v. Reliable Trans-
fer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 397 (1975) (holding when there is need for new remedial
maritime rule, past precedent argues for setting judicially derived standard subject
to congressional revision). But see Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990)
(emphasizing Congress retains superior authority in maritime matters).
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The Court asserted that, in the absence of explicit statutory lan-
guage, the responsibility of addressing the "desirability of regulat-
ing punitive damages as a common law remedy" lay with the
judiciary.' 40 The Court, therefore, embarked on a new law-making
venture by creating a mathematical formula for determining puni-
tive damage awards,14 1 and held that a one-to-one ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages was a fair upper limit.' 4 2 In
setting a rigid ratio and considerably reducing the $2.5 billon award
to $500 million, the Supreme Court claimed to take a neutral
stance and vacated the lower court's judgment. 143
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
At first blush, the Supreme Court's decision appears to be in-
sensitive, overly rigid and an unjust refuge for corporate giants. 144
Upon further scrutiny, however, the Court's reasoning reveals fun-
damental incongruities and a number of insufficiently addressed
questions.
A. Towing the Line: A Legislative-Judicial Tug of War
It is undisputed that general maritime law applies in an admi-
ralty case such as Exxon Shipping Co.1 45 The Court's illustration of
the judge-made nature of federal maritime law also remains uncon-
tested.146 The Court, however, was hasty in justifying the use of a
free-hand in dealing with this entirely remedial matter. 147 Al-
though partly judicial in nature, maritime law is dominated by fed-
eral statutes.' 48 The Court's cursory approach to existing federal
maritime statutes resulted in a failure to recognize that statutes,
even when covering only particular cases, may imply a broader pol-
140. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2630 (asserting complete control over
maritime law making).
141. See id. (relaying departure from prior precedent).
142. See id. at 2632 (holding judicially imposed one-to-one ratio would be just
and reasonable).
143. See id. (reducing punitive award and implementing fixed ratio for future
punitive award determination).
144. See Adam H. Chares & James J. Hefferan Jr., Mostly Pro-Corporation,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 2008, at 9, 11 (suggesting corporate favoritism in judiciary).
145. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2611 (asserting jurisdiction over
case).
146. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 860
(1986) (describing judicial decision making relevance in maritime law creation).
147. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2618 (claiming unrestricted authority
in creating maritime law).
148. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) (reiterating primary
authority of legislative enactments).
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icy excluding judicial action. 149 Courts are not free to direct and
restrict remedies at will simply because of a lack of congressional
specificity. 150 Despite this check on judicial action, the Court in-
sisted that congressional silence and inaction prompted judicial ini-
tiative and created the need for a quantified rule. 51
The Court determined that Congress handed the judiciary
complete responsibility for formulating flexible and fair maritime
remedies, referring to its decision in U.S. v. Reliable Transfer Co. (Re-
liable Transfer).152 In that case, however, there was no statutory or
judicial precept that precluded changing the rule of divided dam-
ages. 153 In fact, evidence supported by subsequent history eroded
the rule's foundation resulting in manifestly unfair results. 154 Addi-
tionally, the Court's decision to abrogate the old rule in favor of
proportional liability in Reliable Transfer finally brought the case in
line with historic congressionally-enacted rules established for per-
sonal injury cases in admiralty law.' 55 Further, the holding in Relia-
ble Transfer was supported by a consensus among the world's
maritime nations and the views of respected scholars and judges
advocating a need for international harmonization. 56
Unlike Reliable Transfer, no comparable consensus has devel-
oped with respect to a need for the creation of a rigid ratio for
punitive damages in admiralty law.157 In Exxon Shipping Co., the
Court was not "in familiar waters" because the need for similar pu-
nitive awards against corporate giants, such as Exxon, has rarely
149. See Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (empha-
sizing legislature's broader messages).
150. See id. at 378 (bringing attention to judicial limitations).
151. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2635 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
Court must exercise judicial restraint when Congress is silent unless Court offers
special justification).
152. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975) (rejecting
respondent's argument that it is up to Congress, not Court, to determine new rule
of damages in maritime collision cases).
153. See id. (holding admiralty rule of divided damages should be replaced by
rule requiring, when possible, allocation of liability for damages in proportion to
relative fault of each party).
154. See id. at 411 (overturning decision which established rule of divided
damages). The Court adopted a rule of proportional liability in maritime tort
cases, an illustrative example of the Court's power to craft flexible and fair reme-
dies in the law maritime. Id.
155. See id. (referring to 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2006)).
156. See id. at 403-04 (pointing out United States is now virtually alone among
world's major maritime nations in not adhering to Brussels Collision Liability Con-
vention with rule of proportional fault).
157. See Robertson, supra note 62, at 160-65 (referring to absence of consen-
sus with respect to need to create fixed mathematical determination of punitive
awards).
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arisen in the maritime context. 158 Although the case did not in-
volve a typical maritime punitive claim, the Court nevertheless
failed to comprehensively discuss the general backdrop of federal
legislation relevant to punitive damages in maritime law. 159 Ex-
isting statutes such as the CWA, OPA and TAPAA do not specifically
address the issue of punitive damages in this situation, and Con-
gress has given no firm indication of its intent to limit the judicial
allowance of punitive damages in admiralty. 60 With respect to the
CWA, the Court acknowledged the lack of congressional intent to
occupy the entire field of pollution remedies, but failed to give due
consideration to the lack of congressional intent to set a fixed puni-
tive damage ratio. 16  Congress, in the exercise of its legislative pow-
ers, is free to say "this much and no more,"1 62 and the Supreme
Court, acting in its capacity as an admiralty court, is not free to go
beyond these expressed or implied limits. 16 3
The Limitation Act is relatively more explicit on the issue, as it
specifically authorizes the limitation of punitive awards in cases of
imputed fault.164 Exxon, however, evidentl y did not invoke the
Act's protection because it recognized the futility of attempting to
establish that it lacked privity or knowledge of Captain Hazelwood's
drinking. 165 Even if Exxon had been successful in using the Act's
protection, there is evidence that in passing TAPAA, Congress in-
tended to prevent the application of the Limitation Act to the trans-
158. See Christopher Green, Punishing Corporations: The Food-Chain Schizophre-
nia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. Rv. 197, 269 (2008) (noting
despite signs of corporate favoritism, corporations have not put themselves in situ-
ations warranting massive punitive awards being levied against them).
159. See Robertson, supra note 62, at 161-65 (discussing varied application of
punitive damages in maritime law).
160. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2636 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (pointing to dearth of congressional intent indicating punitive damage
restrictions).
161. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1397 (1972) (preempting certain
remedies, but not addressing punitive damages).
162. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 24 (1990) (bringing attention
to legislative discretion).
163. See id. (highlighting judicial limitations).
164. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006) (stating shipowners are entitled to limit
liability if negligence or unseaworthy condition which caused loss occurred with-
out privity and knowledge of owner).
165. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (point-
ing to Exxon being unable to seek protection under Limitation Act). Exxon's
Chairman publicly acknowledged that executives had known about Hazelwood's
alcoholism and that it had been a "gross error" to assign him to the safety-sensitive
position of ship master. Id. He called the assignment a "bad judgment ... on a
going in basis." Id.
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Alaskan transportation of oil in order to promote heightened care
in that region.' 66
TAPAA is another statute that specifically caps strict liability,
yet does not restrict or limit the availability of punitive damages. 167
Notwithstanding the inability of the Limitation Act to resolve the
case at bar, the fact that Congress chose to withhold corporate gi-
ants such as Exxon from the Act's generous protection, provides
evidence against the Court extending such a benefit.168 These fed-
eral statutes, taken as a whole, make it clear that there is no present
public policy that supports the limiting of punitive damages in the
corporate maritime context. 169
As explained injustice Stevens' dissent, evidence that Congress
has affirmatively chosen not to restrict the availability of punitive
damages favors judicial restraint, absent special justification. 170 Al-
though Exxon made a considerable clean-up effort and the Exxon
Valdez ship is prohibited from entering The Sound, there is no spe-
cial justification which mandates limiting punitive damages to such
an extent that the very purpose of such damages would be called
into question.' 71 A $500 million award for what the appeals court
called "egregious" conduct, against a company that earned more
than $40 billion in 2007, is unlikely to either deter or punish the
company. 172
Instead of "embarking on a new law-making venture," the ma-
jority should have approved the application of the abuse-of-discre-
tion standard and affirmed the lower court's ruling. 173 As no
constitutional issue was raised in this case, the role of the appellate
166. See TAPAA, 43 U.S.C. § 1651-1656 (2006) (elaborating on restricted ap-
plication concerning Limitation Act).
167. See id. (lacking reference to prohibitions or limitations on punitive dam-
age awards).
168. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (refer-
encing Limitation Act's lack of corporate protection provision).
169. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 390 (1970) (empha-
sizing existing statutes make clear that there is no present public policy against
allowing recovery for wrongful death).
170. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advo-
cating judicial restraint).
171. See Lewis Goldshore & Marsha Wolf, The Mother of All Oil Spills: US. Su-
preme Court Clarifies Punitive Damages, 193 N.J. L.J. 473, 473, Aug. 13, 2008 (noting
despite catastrophic repercussions, Exxon was minimally and negligibly affected).
172. See id. (contrasting punitive awards with Exxon's net profits to reveal in-
significant relevance).
173. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433
(2001) (defining abuse of discretion standard). See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (discussing determination of reasonableness under
abuse of discretion approach).
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system was merely to review the initial award under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. 174 Under that approach, a $2.5 billion puni-
tive award against Exxon does not appear to be "unreasonable,"
considering the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar
wrongful conduct. 75 Moreover, since there is an absence of Con-
gressional intent and no special justification for limiting the dam-
ages, the Court should not have taken matters into its own hands by
adopting a judicially imposed fixed ratio. By presuming a need for
action, the Court in Exxon Shipping Co. appeared unaware of the
constitutional relationship between the judiciary and Congress. 176
B. Mayday: Maritime Law's Unique Composition
Although governed by federal common law, maritime law has
always been distinct from, and has developed principles unknown
to, the common law. 177 Despite not undertaking a constitutional
analysis, the Court relied heavily on its prior due process pro-
nouncements regarding punitive damages, and concluded, as a
matter of maritime law, that high ratios are problematic.1 78 In an
attempt to justify creating a low ratio, the Court emphasized the
need to reduce "the stark unpredictability of punitive awards." 179
The Court, however, has previously sacrificed its interest in cer-
tainty and simplicity for the greater interest of promoting fairness
and justice.' 80 Additionally, the law of admiralty does not seek to
174. See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 424 (holding when "no constitutional issue
is raised, the role of the appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely to
review the trial court's determination [concerning the size of the award] under an
abuse of discretion standard").
175. See In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045 (D. Alaska 2002)
(explaining district court's holding). The district court, after overseeing the gov-
ernment's criminal prosecution of Exxon and later presiding over lengthy trial,
concluded that the jury reasonably could have determined that a multi-billion dol-
lar punitive award was necessary to achieve punishment and deterrence. Id.
176. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 24-27 (1990) (outlining funda-
mental relationship between Congress and judiciary).
177. See WILLAM TETLEY, Maritime Law as a Mixed Legal System, 23 TUL. MAR.
LJ. 317, 317 (1999) (describing maritime law's unique approach to proportionate
fault, attachment, ship-owner's liability, etc.).
178. See Lester Sotsky & Daniel J. Stuart, Toxic Tort Litigation: Punitive Post-
"Exxon"?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 2008, at 12, 12 (discussing faulty reasoning in Exxon
Shipping Co. and possible impacts).
179. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008) (attempting
to advocate need for predictability).
180. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 202 (1994) (concluding
promotion of justice was of primary importance). Thus the interest in certainty
and simplicity served by the old rule was outweighed by the interest in fairness
promoted by the proportionate fault rule. Id.
2009]
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achieve uniformity of process beyond the rudimentary elements of
procedural fairness.181
Yet, the perceived need for predictability in common law puni-
tive damage assessments does not generally translate into a parallel
need in maritime law.' 82 Moreover, the Court failed to provide
even one example of a judicially-imposed precise ratio because no
previous court sitting in admiralty has recognized the need for
more stringent standards.18 3 The Court, therefore, did not discern
an adequate reason for extending a need to limit common law pu-
nitive damages to admiralty; a system of law that is, in many ways,
different from common law.184
Additionally, as Justice Stevens' dissent points out, the majority
failed to give full credence to maritime law's less generous scheme
of compensatory damages.18 5 Unlike land-based tort cases, general
maritime law limits the availability of compensatory damages by rec-
ognizing certain injuries as only partially compensable, if at all.'8 6
For example, maritime law forbids recovery for many economic in-
juries, but all emotional injuries. 187 This unique feature of mari-
time law supports the contention that maritime compensatory
awards may require supplementation. 18 8 Although primarily aimed
at deterrence and punishment, the doctrine of punitive damages
has its foundation in recognizing a need to compensate injuries
181. SeeAm. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994) (outlining goals of
admiralty law).
182. See TETLEY, supra note 177, at 319 (discussing distinctive nature of Ameri-
can maritime law, which adopts benefits from both civil and common law heritages
but is generally different in nature).
183. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (bring-
ing attention to majority's lack of support). See also Robertson, supra note 62, at 88-
115, 128-38 (describing maritime decisions upholding punitive damage awards).
184. See generally Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 375-90
(1970) (distinguishing between admiralty law and common law).
185. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2635 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (draw-
ing necessary attention to maritime law's composition).
186. See id. (highlighting insufficiently compensated harms). See also Paul S.
Edelman, Evolving Issues of Compensatory Damages in Maritime Law, 2003 ASS'N OF
TRIAL LAw. OF AM. 35 (providing overview of injuries not accounted for by com-
pensatory damages in maritime law).
187. See Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. MT FADI B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding injuries not compensable); see also Robins Dry Dock & Repair v.
Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 303 (1927) (disallowing awarding of damages). See Louisiana
ex rel. Custe v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019, 1035 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom,J.,
dissenting) (noting maritime law restricts reach of foreseeability and proximate
cause).
188. See Edelman, supra note 186, at 11 (discussing various instances of mari-
time compensatory regime ignoring injuries).
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which ought to be redressed. 89 The Court's quantified limit on
punitive awards, therefore, prevents the ability of punitive damages
to compensate for those injuries that even compensatory damages
fail to address.1 90
More importantly, the Court failed to acknowledge that reck-
less oil spills exact a human toll; one that may take years to measure
and even longer to litigate. 19 1 Consequently, a fixed ratio might
not be compatible with injuries of this nature. 19 2 The Exxon
Valdez oil spill permanently "disrupted the lives and livelihood of
thousands of people in the region."1 93 Commercial fishermen were
unable to recover anything for the profound emotional impact the
spill had on them and their families.' 94 Local Native Americans
were also left uncompensated for the impact on their subsistence
cultures, as the spill destroyed their traditional way of life.19 5 Fur-
thermore, maritime law did not allow any compensatory damages
for the "price diminishment in fisheries that were not oiled, dimin-
ished value of limited entry fishing permits, damages to un-oiled
land, or diminution of market value owing to fear or stigma."' 96
The initial $2.5 billion punitive award, therefore, may have better
reflected not only these real and foreseeable effects, but also the
more remote and intangible effects of Exxon's conduct. 19 7
The Court's contention that the award was "excessive" and
larger than previous maritime awards simply ignores the unprece-
dented scope of harm that Exxon's highly reprehensible conduct
inflicted.' 9 8 The overall figure also appears large because this case,
at Exxon's request, proceeded as a mandatory class action, which
189. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties,
87 GEo. L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (elaborating on theory of punitive damages).
190. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2635 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ob-
jecting to majority's reduction in punitive award).
191. See Rydstrom, supra note 95, at 346 (highlighting unique nature of oil
pollution disasters).
192. See id. (relaying various approaches to calculating potential remedies).
193. For a description of the economic ramifications of the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
194. See Markey, supra note 28 (empathizing with oil spill victims whose liveli-
hood was destroyed).
195. See id. (noting devastating harm Native Alaskans suffered in aftermath of
spill).
196. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Airport Depot Diner, 120 F.3d 166, 167 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1997) (stating maritime law's compensatory scheme did not account for cer-
tain juries caused in wake of spill).
197. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2635 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to reduction in punitive award).
198. See Goldshore & Wolf, supra note 171, at 510 (discounting Exxon Shipping
Co. reasoning).
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brought together the claims of more than thirty-two thousand
claimants.1 99 Contrary to the Court's assertion, the average amount
of compensated economic harm per class member was not "sub-
stantial," and averaged less than $15,500.200 The common law has
long recognized, however, that "punitive damages represent the as-
sessment by the jury, as the voice of the community, of the measure
of punishment the defendant deserved."20' Even among the states
with statutory limitations on punitive awards, most do not apply to
awards under one hundred thousand dollars per victim; several
others even suspend existing limitations in cases involving grave
harm. 202
The Supreme Court is responsible for vindicating the unique
policies of maritime law, but that responsibility should not be exe-
cuted at the cost of ceding to the inconveniences and rigidity cre-
ated by a fixed ratio.203 A court's lawmaking authority, as Justice
Holmes famously explained,, is only "interstitial in nature... [i] t
does not license judges, as a legislature might do, to undertake ma-
jor reallocations of costs and risks."204 Consequently, the Court
should not have immunized Exxon, imposed a permanent ratio
that is not conducive to maritime law's unique nature, or underesti-
mated the ability of punitive damages to prevent and deter future
maritime disasters that result in cascading harm.
VI. IMPACT
The Supreme Court, acting in its capacity as an admiralty
court, has a duty to perceive the impact and potential consequences
of new rulemaking. 20 5 This "something for everyone" decision has
the potential to greatly impact future cases in both maritime law
199. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & RobertJ. Nelson, Class Action Treatment of Pu-
nitive Damages Issues, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 407, 408-20 (2008) (elaborating on
procedural and substantive differences in punitive award deliberations when in-
volving class action suits).
200. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2626 (deeming reduced award to be
sufficient and reasonable).
201. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (noting punitive awards represent integral jury opinions).
202. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(3)(d) (West 2004) (suspending limi-
tation when intoxicated harm results).
203. See Brown, supra note 82, at 249 (discussing inappropriateness of mathe-
matical formula in certain situations).
204. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(commenting on court's lawmaking authority).
205. See Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (drawing focus
to Supreme Court's duty when acting in admiralty capacity).
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and general common law.20 6 If viewed in isolation, the Court's de-
cision can be narrowly construed as a maritime decision, which is
inapplicable outside the boundaries of admiralty law.20 7 It is more
likely, however, that the decision will have far-reaching conse-
quences. 208 Although the extent to which this decision may apply
to federal cases remains to be seen, it is anticipated that the Court's
reasoning will be persuasive outside the maritime context.20 9
Defendants will likely argue that because the Court's reasoning
relied heavily upon its prior due process pronouncements, its con-
clusion should apply to a broad range of cases. 210 The Court's em-
brace of a one-to-one ratio as an acceptable norm, affords lower
courts a solid, new platform in support of reducing larger awards
on constitutional or other grounds. 211 State judges, who find the
Supreme Court's reasoning instructive and influential, may make
their own common law assessments of reasonableness, thereby over-
stepping the boundaries created by the Constitution. 212 Many envi-
ronmental law scholars also wonder whether the Court's decision to
be a "harbinger of shrinking punitive awards," will dampen judicial
approval of punitive awards in environmental, toxic tort and other
actions, where unrestrained damages are both appropriate and
justified. 213
This case may also have an effect outside the courtroom by
shaping which cases are settled and which go forward to litiga-
206. See Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 178, at 12 (notingJustice Souter's "some-
thing for everyone" opinion will have lasting and far-reaching effects).
207. See id. (discussing various potential interpretations of Exxon Shipping Co.
decision).
208. See Tony Mauro, At Issue in "Exxon" Case: How Decisive Is Stare Decisis?,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1204544927227 (noting decision can be applied to other areas of federal common
law where punitive damage awards are allowed).
209. See RICHARD L. BLATr, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO
LAW AND PRACTICE 1.3.B. (2006) (claiming that Court's finding will extend beyond
current maritime law). Specifically, commentators note that "punitive damages
may be contrasted with compensatory damages, special damages, contract dam-
ages, restitution, or equitable damages, which, in contrast to punitive damages, are
measured by difference in the position of the party after the wrong as compared to
that party's position before the wrong." Id.
210. See Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 178, at 2 (deliberating impact of Exxon
Shipping Co. in federal common law).
211. See id. (discussing potential reliance by lower courts).
212. See, e.g., Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d. 429, 484 (W.D.
Pa. 2008) (citing reasoning in Exxon Shipping Co.); see also Leavey v. Unum Provi-
dent Corp., 295 F. App'x 255, 259 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing reasoning in Exxon
Shipping Co.).
213. See Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 178, at 1 (speculating about impact of
Exxon Shipping Co. in other maritime matters).
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tion.2 14 With punitive awards being determined on the basis of
compensatory damages, plaintiffs will tend to only bring punitive
claims involving substantial and quantifiable compensatory dam-
ages.21 5 Without the prospect of unrestrained punitive damages, it
will not make economic sense for plaintiffs' lawyers to invest in
modest compensatory damage cases. 216 Additionally, the "dimin-
ishing prospect of large awards" may discourage future class action
plaintiffs from availing themselves of the advantages of the appel-
late system.217 As Exxon Shipping Co. significantly decreased the ini-
tial jury award, public faith in the judiciary may have also been
shaken.
On the other hand, conventional wisdom holds that defend-
ants are more likely to settle when facing potential runaway ver-
dicts, such as massive punitive damage awards.218 The hope of
avoiding trial through settling will certainly dictate future defend-
ants' decisions "whether to litigate and how vigorously."2 1 9 Big cor-
porations such as Exxon, may also be encouraged to elongate suits
brought against them so that damages can be eventually reduced to
merely another cost of doing business. Unlike the Alaskan fisher-
men and their families, who had to put their lives on hold only to
end up with an additional fifteen thousand dollars in punitive dam-
ages, Exxon's situation actually improved over time. 220 If the Su-
preme Court had affirmed the Ninth Circuit's award, each claimant
would have received approximately seventy-six thousand dollars; a
figure totaling only about three weeks of Exxon's 2007 net prof-
its.22 1 The potential, or lack thereof, for punitive damages, may,
therefore, become the driving factor in upcoming litigation
strategies. 2
22
214. See id. (providing foresight as to implications of Exxon Shipping Co. in
litigation in general).
215. See Hylton, supra note 189, at 421 (elaborating on theory of punitive
damages).
216. See id. at 429 (discussing influence of ratios on litigation options).
217. See Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 178, at 1 (considering impact of Exxon
Shipping Co. on adversarial system).
218. See id. (referencing defendants' motivations behind settling).
219. See id. (providing overview of defendants' possible consideration post-
Exxon Shipping Co.).
220. See Joel Connelly, Exxon's slap on the wrist, SEArrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
June 25, 2008, available at http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/seattlepolitics/
archives/ 142017.asp (describing Exxon's changing liability).
221. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Numbers, supra note 2 (providing statistical
data for Exxon Valdez oil spill).
222. See Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 178, at 1 (foreseeing punitive damages
dictating major portions of litigation system).
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By constructing a rigid ratio, the Supreme Court ignored the
widespread harm that typically accompanies maritime disasters and
further underestimated the vital role punitive damages play in
preventing the repetition of such disasters. 223 The Court's decision
prevents future tortfeasors from having to internalize the complete
consequences of their conduct, no matter how egregious. 224 Since
the reach of this decision is uncertain, however, the Court's attempt
to promote systemic consistency may be futile. Only time will tell
whether or not the Supreme Court's decision will have these and
other far-reaching consequences.
While these issues continue to be debated amongst environ-
mental activists, Supreme Court reporters and the public at large,
twenty-six thousand gallons of oil still remain at the bottom of the
Sound.225 Yet, one fact that is beyond debate is that the Exxon
Valdez oil spill is the United States' worst anthropogenically-caused
environmental tragedy.226 Although the Court's conclusion in this
volatile legal saga certainly has its merits, the penultimate principle
that, "it better becomes the humane and liberal character of pro-
ceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy," if fol-
lowed in spirit, would have found a welcome echo in the world's
collective conscience. 227 For now, the Supreme Court's verdict con-
tinues to be a low-tide mark in judicial history.
Tanya Paula de Sousa*
223. See DeGravelles, supra note 66, at 50 (discussing punitive damages' con-
comitant role in maritime law).
224. See Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 178, at 12 (elaborating on serious conse-
quence of Exxon Shipping Co. decision).
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226. See Markey, supra note 28 (highlighting point of agreement concerning
spill).
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